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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Enola Branch is a 66.5 mile railroad line which was 
built in the early Twentieth Century and was known as one 
of the remarkable engineering feats of that time. Petitioner, 
Friends of the Atglen-Susquehana Trail, Inc. (FAST), seeks 
judicial review of a final order of the Surface Transportation 
Board (STB)1 permitting abandonment of the Enola Branch. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The STB is the federal agency having exclusive jurisdiction over 
transportation by railroad. See 49 U.S.C. S 10501(a)(1). The STB is the 
successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which 
was abolished by Congress in 1995. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, 
S 101, P.L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 804, 49 U.S.C. S 701 note (1995). That act 
also established the STB, see 49 U.S.C.S 701, and provided that it 
would perform all the functions that pr eviously were performed by the 
ICC as of the effective date of the act. See 49 U.S.C. S 702; see also ICC 
Termination Act of 1995, S 204, P .L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 804, 49 U.S.C. 
S 701 note. 
 
In this opinion, we will refer to the agency as the ICC before its 
abolition and as the STB afterwards. 
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FAST challenges the manner in which the STB carried out 
its responsibilities under S 106 of the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. S 470f. In particular, 
FAST objects to the manner in which the STB identified and 
protected historic properties along the line, to the STB's 
failure to consider evidence that the corridor as a whole 
was entitled to protection as a historic pr operty, and to the 
manner in which the STB terminated consultation on a 
plan to protect historically eligible pr operty. For the reasons 
that follow, we will vacate the STB's decision and r emand 
this matter to it for further consideration. 
 
I. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
 
A. ABANDONMENT OF RAIL LINES 
 
FAST seeks review of the actions of the STB in the 
exercise of its exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over rail 
carriers and rail transportation, particularly its jurisdiction 
to permit a rail carrier to abandon or discontinue use of an 
existing rail line that might qualify as or contain historic 
property. We begin, therefor e, with an overview of the 
relevant regulatory landscape. 
 
A rail carrier intending to abandon, and to be r eleased 
from its obligations to retain or operate, any part of its 
railroad lines must file an application to do so with the STB 
and such abandonment must adhere to certain established 
procedures. See 49 U.S.C. S 10903(a)(1)(A); see also 49 
U.S.C. SS 10903-10907. The STB is empower ed to exempt a 
transaction from the ordinary regulatory requirements if 
the STB finds that the ordinary procedur es are not 
necessary to carry out federal transportation policy and 
that either the transaction is limited in scope or the full 
application procedures are not necessary to protect 
shippers from any abuses of market power . See 49 U.S.C. 
S 10502(a). 
 
The abandonment of a rail line or corridor will qualify as 
an exempt transaction if the carrier certifies that no local 
traffic has moved over the line for at least two years, that 
any traffic on the line can be rerouted over other lines, and 
that no formal complaints, regarding cessation of service on 
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the line, are pending or have been decided within that two- 
year period. See 49 C.F.R. S 1152.50(b). This process is 
intended to be an expedited one. The exemption, and 
therefore permission to abandon the rail line, becomes 
effective 30 days after publication of notice in the Federal 
Register. See 49 C.F.R. 1152.50(d)(3); see also 49 U.S.C. 
S 10502(b) ("Any proceeding begun as a result of an 
application under this subsection shall be completed within 
9 months after it is begun."). An exempt abandonment 
remains subject to any conditions that the STB may impose 
upon it. 
 
If the STB agrees that a proposed abandonment is 
exempt and allows the abandonment to proceed under the 
expedited procedures, the STB must consider certain 
factors prior to permitting the abandonment to become 
final. See 49 C.F.R. S 1152.50(a)(2). First, the STB must 
consider and determine whether the rail pr operties to be 
abandoned are appropriate for use for public purposes. See 
49 U.S.C. S 10905;2 49 C.F .R. S 1152.28(a)(1). If the STB 
finds that the properties are appr opriate for public use, the 
STB is authorized to impose conditions on the 
abandonment of the property by the carrier . Such 
conditions may include a prohibition on the disposal of the 
property for a period of 180 days unless the pr operty is first 
offered, on reasonable terms, for sale for public purposes. 
See 49 U.S.C. S 10905; 49 C.F.R. S 1152.28(d). Second, the 
STB must consider possible interim trail use or rail banking,3 
should any state, political subdivision, or qualified private 
organization be interested in acquiring or using the rail line 
right-of-way in such a manner. See 16 U.S.C. S 1247(d); 49 
C.F.R. S 1152.29. Third, the STB must comply with the 
requirements of S 106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act, 16 U.S.C. S 470f. 
 
The exemption procedures of S 10502 and S 1152.50 are 
intended to expedite the approval of the pr oposed 
abandonment by making it effective almost immediately, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Formerly 49 U.S.C. S 10906. 
 
3. This would permit the railroad right-of-way to be used in some interim 
manner and to be preserved for future r estoration or reconstruction and 
reactivation for railroad purposes. See 49 U.S.C. S 1247(d). 
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subject to any conditions imposed by the STB. 
Consideration of the S 106 historic pr eservation process, on 
the other hand, necessarily requires the STB to proceed 
more slowly. The fact that Congress has introduced a 
procedure which permits the slowing of the overall 
abandonment process reflects Congr ess's intent to balance 
immediate, fast-track approval of the abandonment by the 
carrier with a more deliberate consideration of preservation 
of historically significant properties. See Concerned Citizens 
Alliance, Inc. v. Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC , 848 F.2d 1246, 
1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing S 106 as "stop, look, 
and listen" provision requiring an agency to acquire 
information before acting)). 
 
B. HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
 
Section 106 of the NHPA provides as follows: 
 
        The head of any Federal agency having dir ect or 
       indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or 
       federally assisted undertaking in any State and the 
       head of any Federal department or independent agency 
       having authority to license any undertaking shall, prior 
       to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds 
       on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any 
       license, as the case may be, take into account the 
       effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, 
       structure, or object that is included in or eligible for 
       inclusion in the National Register. 
 
16 U.S.C. S 470f. The NHPA is a pr ocedural statute 
designed to ensure that, as part of the planning process for 
properties under the jurisdiction of a federal agency, the 
agency takes into account any adverse effects on historical 
places from actions concerning that pr operty. See Morris 
County Trust for Historical Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 
271, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1983). The STB, as a federal agency, 
must adhere to S 106 in considering and approving 
exemption or abandonment of a rail line. See 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.2(a). 
 
The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) has 
promulgated regulations outlining the pr ocedures to be 
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followed by an agency in satisfying its responsibilities under 
S 106, codified at 36 C.F.R. Part 800. See Morris County 
Trust, 714 F.2d at 280 ("[T]he Advisory Council's 
regulations are particularly persuasive concerning the 
proper interpretation of NHPA.") An agency is expected to 
consult with various interested parties thr oughout the 
S 106 process, including the State Historical Preservation 
Officer (SHPO), who is the state official appointed or 
designated, pursuant to S 101(b)(1) of the NHP A, 16 U.S.C. 
S 470a(b)(1), to administer the state historic preservation 
program. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.16(v); see also 16 U.S.C. 
S 470a(b)(3) (establishing the responsibilities of the SHPO). 
The agency, in consultation with the SHPO, must also 
involve the public in the process, see 36 C.F.R. S 800.3(e), 
and identify other parties that should be invited to 
participate in the process as consulting parties, including 
local governments and those parties that r equest to 
participate in the process. See 36 C.F .R. S 800.3(f)(1-3). The 
ACHP itself must be afforded a "r easonable opportunity to 
comment on such undertakings." 16 U.S.C. S 470f; 36 
C.F.R. S 800.1(a); see also Concer ned Citizens, 176 F.3d at 
695 (holding that the Council's comments must be taken 
into account and integrated into the decisionmaking 
process). 
 
The ACHP regulations establish a three-step process: 
identification of historic properties; assessment of any 
adverse effects of the proposed undertaking on such 
properties; and creation of a plan to avoid, minimize, or 
mitigate those adverse effects. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.1(a). The 
agency, in consultation with the SHPO and other interested 
parties, may address multiple steps in one consultation as 
long as all parties are given an adequate opportunity to 
comment. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.3(g). 
 
In order to identify historic properties, the agency must 
apply the criteria established for the National Register of 
Historic Places (National Register) to identify pr operties and 
to determine whether they would be eligible for the National 
Register. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.4(c)(1). Significantly, the 
regulations provide that the "passage of time, changing 
perceptions of significance, or incomplete prior evaluations 
may require the Agency Official to r eevaluate properties 
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previously determined eligible or ineligible." 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.4(c)(1). 
 
If the agency and the SHPO agree that the criteria for the 
National Register have been met, the property or portion 
thereof shall be considered eligible for the National Register 
for S 106 purposes. See 36 C.F .R. S 800.4(c)(2). If the 
agency and the SHPO agree that the criteria have not been 
met, the property is considered ineligible. See id. If the 
agency and the SHPO do not agree, or if the ACHP or the 
Secretary of the Interior so requests, the agency "shall" 
obtain a determination from the Secr etary, acting through 
the Keeper of the National Register (Keeper), as to the 
historic eligibility of the property. See id. Other courts of 
appeals have held that this determination by the Secretary 
or the Keeper should be conclusive. See Moody Hill Farms 
Ltd. Partnership v. United States Department of the Interior, 
205 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing the 
independent authority of the Keeper, on behalf of the 
Secretary, to determine whether a pr operty should be listed 
as historic); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 441 
n.13 (9th Cir.) (noting that the Secr etary's opinion as to the 
historic eligibility of property is conclusive). 
 
If the agency finds that there are no historic properties 
that will be affected by the undertaking, the agency must 
document its findings and provide such documentation to 
the ACHP, the SHPO, and other consulting parties. The 
SHPO and the ACHP have 30 days to object to thatfinding; 
otherwise, the agency's S 106 responsibilities are deemed 
completed. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.4(d)(1). If the agency finds 
that there are historic properties that may be affected, the 
agency must notify all consulting parties and invite their 
views on the effects of the proposed undertaking and their 
assessments of any adverse effects. See  36 C.F.R. 
S 800.4(d)(2). 
 
An adverse effect is found when the undertaking may 
alter, directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics that 
make a property historic and eligible for inclusion in the 
National Register. See 36 C.F .R. SS 800.5(a)(1), 800.16(i). 
Such adverse effects include physical destruction of or 
damage to all or part of the property, alteration of the 
property, removal of property fr om its historic location, or 
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a change in the character of the property's use. See 36 
C.F.R. S 800.5(a)(2). The regulations establish the steps that 
an agency must take in determining whether or not there 
are adverse effects and in notifying interested parties of its 
findings. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.5. However, agencies, as did 
the STB here, will often assume the occurr ence of adverse 
effects to properties identified as historic. Once the agency 
finds (or assumes) the existence of adverse ef fects, the 
agency must continue consulting with the parties in order 
to resolve such adverse effects and to develop and evaluate 
alternatives or modifications to the undertaking that will 
avoid, minimize, or mitigate such effects. See 36 C.F.R. 
SS 800.5(d)(2), 800.6(a). The agency must also notify the 
ACHP of the adverse effect finding and pr ovide certain 
specified documentation. See 36 C.F .R. S 800.6(a)(1). 
 
The process then moves to the third andfinal step, the 
resolution of adverse effects and the development of a plan 
to avoid, minimize, or mitigate the adverse ef fects. At this 
stage, the SHPO and any other consulting parties may 
invite the ACHP to participate in the consultation; under 
certain circumstances, the ACHP must be invited to 
participate. See 36 C.F.R. SS 800.6(a)(1)(i), (ii). The agency 
and the other consulting parties may also agr ee to invite 
new parties to consult. They are requir ed to invite any 
organization that will play a specific r ole or assume special 
responsibility in any mitigation plan. See  36 C.F.R. 
S 800.6(a)(2). 
 
The ACHP has discretion at this stage to decide if it will 
consult formally. See 36 C.F.R.S 800.6(a)(1)(iii); see also 36 
C.F.R. Part 800 App. A (setting forth criteria that the ACHP 
uses to determine whether formally to enter a particular 
S 106 review). Its decision deter mines how the agency must 
proceed. If the ACHP chooses not to join the consultation 
formally, section 800.6(b)(1) of the ACHP r egulations 
controls. The agency consults with the SHPO and other 
consulting parties in devising a plan to avoid or mitigate 
the adverse effects. If the agency and the SHPO agree on a 
plan, they execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), a 
copy of which must be submitted to the ACHP for its 
comments prior to the agency approving the undertaking. 
See 36 C.F.R. S 800.6(b)(1)(iv); see also 36 C.F.R. 
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S 800.6(c)(1)(i). An executed MOA evidences the agency's 
compliance with S 106 of the NHPA and governs the 
carrying out of the federal undertaking. See 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.6(c). If the agency and the SHPO fail to agree on a 
plan, the agency must ask the ACHP formally to join the 
consultation. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.6(b)(1)(v). If the ACHP 
again declines to consult formally, it must pr ovide 
comments on the undertaking and on the status of the 
S 106 review, which the agency must consider in reaching 
any final decision as to mitigation. See 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.6(b)(1)(v); see also 36 C.F .R. S 800.7(c). 
 
If, at any point, the ACHP formally joins the consultation 
on mitigation, section 800.6(b)(2) controls. The ACHP must 
execute the MOA along with the agency, the SHPO, and any 
other consulting parties. See 36 C.F .R. S 800.6(b)(2); see 
also 36 C.F.R. S 800.6(c)(1)(ii). Any party that assumes a 
responsibility in carrying out the MOA may also be asked 
to be a signatory to the MOA. See 36 C.F .R. S 800.6(c)(2)(ii). 
 
If, at any point during consultation, the agency, the 
SHPO, or the ACHP determines that further consultation 
will not be productive, any of them may, upon notice to the 
other consulting parties, terminate consultation. See 36 
C.F.R. S 800.7(a). If the agency ter minates the consultation, 
it must request and receive comment fr om the ACHP. See 
36 C.F.R. S 800.7(a)(1). 
 
Comments from the ACHP are governed by S 800.7(c). 
The ACHP has 45 days from receipt of a r equest to provide 
comments on an agency's termination of mitigation 
consultation, pursuant to S 800.7(a)(1), or on an agency's 
statement that it is unable to reach an MOA thr ough 
consultation with the SHPO alone, pursuant to 
S 800.6(b)(1)(v). See 36 C.F.R.S 800.7(c)(2). The agency 
must take these comments into account in reaching a final 
decision on the undertaking, see 36 C.F .R. S 800.7(c)(4), 
and the agency is required to document that it did so by 
explaining its decision and providing evidence that it 
considered the ACHP's comments. See 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.7(c)(4)(i); see also Concerned Citizens, 176 F.3d at 696 
(stating that the "relevant agency must demonstrate that it 
has read and considered" the opinions and 
recommendations of the ACHP). This decision and 
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explanation is to be provided to the ACHP , to all consulting 
parties, and to the public prior to the final appr oval and 





There is no dispute as to the underlying facts or the 
course of the regulatory proceedings in this matter. In 
October 1989, Conrail4 filed a Notice of Exemption with the 
ICC, seeking to abandon the Enola Branch, a 66.5-mile rail 
corridor running through Lancaster and Chester Counties, 
in Pennsylvania. Conrail certified that no traffic had moved 
over the line for two years. There is no suggestion that 
Conrail did not adhere to the filing and notice requirements 
for seeking an exemption. Lancaster County objected to 
Conrail's petition, primarily seeking a public use or interim 
trail use and rail banking condition on the exemption. 
Although the County did not expressly raiseS 106 or seek 
a historic condition on the abandonment, it did pr ovide the 
following description of the rail line to the ICC: 
 
       The Enola Branch railroad line itself is a historically 
       significant resource. Pennsylvania Railr oad President 
       A.J. Cassett built the railroad line as a passenger route 
       through Pennsylvania and Ohio in the first decade of 
       this century. It was once a vital east-west fr eight line 
       for southeastern Pennsylvania. The families of Italian 
       laborers constructed the line and now inhabit the 
       Quarryville area. The railroad corridor is designed and 
       constructed to have little slope, so it either cuts into 
       the ground or is elevated over most of its length. The 
       project is known as one of the most remarkable 
       engineering feats of its time. The physical impacts of 
       the corridor on adjacent land owners is negligible. The 
       line is very well designed with the landscape to limit 
       obtrusiveness to the natural character of the ar ea. It is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Conrail's assets have been acquired by, and divided between, two 
railroad operations, Norfolk Souther n Corp. (Norfolk) and CSX Corp. The 
former Enola Line is now controlled by Norfolk, which intervened in this 
appeal on behalf of the STB. 
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       said the earth moving involved in the project rivaled 
       that of the construction of the Panama Canal. 
 
The ICC issued an Order on February 22, 1990 (1990 
Order) in which it granted to Conrail the exemption, subject 
to three conditions: 1) that Conrail keep intact all the right- 
of-way underlying the track, including bridges and culverts, 
for a period of 180 days, to allow for the negotiation of a 
public use acquisition; 2) that Conrail comply with terms 
and conditions for implementing possible interim trail use 
and rail banking; and 3) "that Conrail take no steps to alter 
the historic integrity of the bridges on the line until 
completion of the section 106 process of the National 
Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. S 470." Negotiations 
between Conrail and Lancaster County to preserve the line, 
either through sale for public use or for interim trail use 
and rail banking, proved unsuccessful, despite extensions 
well beyond the 180-day period provided for in the 1990 
Order. The record indicates that the trail use plan fell 
through in part because FAST was unable to act as a 
financially responsible party for an interim trail use or to 
find a public sponsor, as requir ed under 49 C.F.R. 
S 1152.29(a)(2). On April 19, 1993, the ICC denied 
Lancaster County's request for a further extension of the 
negotiating period, vacated the trail use condition, and 
granted Conrail permission to abandon the line (1993 
Order). 
 
The remaining condition on abandonment was for the 
preservation of historically significant pr operties, pending 
STB's completion of the S 106 process. The 1990 Order only 
required preservation of the historic integrity of the bridges 
on the line. This limitation apparently was based on a 1989 
telephone conversation between a member of the ICC's 
Section of Environmental Analysis (SEA) and Pennsylvania's 
SHPO, the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, Bureau for Historic Preservation (PHMC). In 
that conversation, the SHPO indicated that some or all of 
the 83 bridges on the line potentially were eligible for 
inclusion in the National Register but that it had not 
completed its review. The 1990 Order did not discuss or 
address the comments from Lancaster County about the 
historic significance of the line as a whole. The ICC also 
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never sought a determination from the Secretary of the 
Interior or the Keeper as to the historic eligibility of the line 
as a whole or of other portions of the rail corridor . The 1990 
Order made no final identification of eligible historic 
properties but limited the scope of possible historic 
properties to some or all of the bridges on the line, as 
initially identified by the SHPO in the telephone 
conversation. 
 
The ICC then followed its common practice of assuming 
that abandonment of the Enola Branch corridor would 
adversely affect the rail properties identified as historic, i.e., 
some or all of the 83 bridges. The ICC therefor e proceeded 
to the third step in the S 106 pr ocess, development of a 
plan to avoid, minimize, or mitigate the adverse ef fects. The 
record does not indicate, however, that the ICC notified the 
ACHP of the presumptive finding of adverse ef fects. 
 
The final, mitigation stage of the S 106 pr ocess was also 
a long one. It was complicated by the fact that in April 
1996, FAST petitioned the STB to reopen the proceedings 
and to broaden the S 106 condition to encompass the entire 
Enola Branch, as the eligible historic property to be 
preserved. In its petition, FAST r elied on a letter dated 
February 24, 1994, from Brenda Barr ett, director of the 
PHMC (the Pennsylvania SHPO), to Wendy T ippetts of an 
organization known as "TWO."5  In that letter, Barrett stated 
that, in the opinion of the SHPO, the Enola Branch and the 
Atglen & Susquehana Branch both were eligible for listing 
in the National Register. The STB was sent a copy of the 
letter. 
 
The STB responded to the petition on October 2, 1997 
(1997 Order) by ordering that 1) the pr oceeding was 
reopened, 2) the request by FAST to expand the condition 
to include the entire Enola Line was denied, and 3) the 
S 106 condition imposed in 1990 was modified to 
encompass only 32 bridges on the line and ar chaeological 
sites near 36 bridges as the properties eligible for listing in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. At oral argument, counsel for FAST represented that FAST hired 
Tippetts as consultant in the efforts to preserve the corridor as historic 
property. Nothing has been presented to us explaining what "TWO" 
stands for. 
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the National Register. In explaining its decision to deny 
FAST's petition to expand the scope of the eligible historic 
property, the Board stated that 
 
       Neither FAST nor the SHPO has provided any 
       justification for the SHPO's apparently changed 
       position with regard to eligibility of the entire line in 
       the National Register. Indeed, the SHPO letter 
       submitted by FAST does not even acknowledge that the 
       SHPO had ever reached a previous deter mination on 
       this matter. . . . It is clear that the SHPO was originally 
       concerned only with the eligibility of certain bridges 
       and archaeological sites for section 106 purposes. The 
       fact that certain items were included in the SHPO's 
       original opinion while others were excluded indicates 
       that the SHPO did not originally consider the entir e 
       line eligible.6 
 
FAST timely petitioned for reconsideration of the refusal 
to reopen the proceedings and to expand the identified 
eligible historic properties. With that petition pending, the 
parties proceeded along separate tracks. F AST and other 
interested parties requested that the STB formally submit 
the question of the historical significance of the Enola 
Branch line as a whole to the ACHP for referral to the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Keeper for a conclusive 
determination. When FAST received no response from the 
STB, FAST asked the ACHP to become involved in the 
process. The ACHP wrote to the STB in Mar ch 1998, 
asserting that the STB never notified the ACHP of its 
finding of adverse effects, never identified potentially 
interested parties to consult on the S 106 process, and 
never informed the ACHP as to how it identified eligible 
property. The ACHP requested that it be included in the 
S 106 process and that it be provided background 
documentation. The STB never responded to this letter. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The STB also questioned the applicability of the letter, noting that, 
although the caption of the letter contained the correct docket number, 
it referred to a project encompassing additional lines and counties. The 
STB stated that it "is unclear what this pr oject entails." The STB also 
noted that any information submitted by F AST in support of the 
eligibility of the entire line had not been supplied to Conrail or 
submitted 
for entry in the public record. 
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Meanwhile, the STB proceeded as if the first two steps of 
the S 106 process, identification of eligible properties and 
determination of adverse effects, had been concluded and 
the only remaining step was to devise a plan to mitigate the 
adverse effects on the bridges and archaeological sites that 
it had identified as eligible properties. The STB formally 
consulted with the SHPO and Conrail; the recor d does not 
indicate that the STB formally invited the ACHP to consult 
on the mitigation plan. In August 1998, the STB drafted an 
MOA, memorializing terms that had been agr eed upon by 
the SHPO, Conrail, and the STB. The plan provided that 1) 
Conrail would perform recor dation of five identified bridges 
to State Level Recordation Standards prior to the demolition 
of those bridges, 2) Conrail would provide funding in excess 
of $15,000 to the Railroad Museum of Pennsylvania for 
development of a 6-8 minute video outlining the history of 
the Enola Branch, 3) Conrail would convey segments of the 
abandoned line and bridges to local townships and would 
provide the municipalities with an agreed sum of money for 
future maintenance of those bridges. 
 
The MOA was submitted to the SHPO and Conrail for 
execution, to the ACHP for approval, as well as to FAST and 
the Historic Preservation Trust of Lancaster County (the 
Trust) for comments. In the transmittal letter to the ACHP, 
the STB for the first time broached the possibility of 
breaking off consultation, stating that"[i]f it appears that 
further consultation would not be productive, we will 
terminate consultation." 
 
The SHPO declined to sign the MOA, citing the ACHP's 
concerns that it had not been asked to consult in the 
development of the MOA; the SHPO withheld further r eview 
and signature of the plan until the STB had consulted with 
the ACHP. FAST stated specific objections to the draft MOA, 
noting FAST's desire to preserve the line and to establish a 
trail on the corridor. FAST also objected to the manner in 
which public input had been gathered for the pr oject. 
 
The ACHP, upon receipt of the draft MOA, asserted that 
the matter of the STB's overall compliance withS 106 
"remains unresolved" and that "serious shortcomings 
persist in STB's evaluation of historic properties, 
solicitation of public input, evaluation of alter natives, and, 
 
                                14 
  
development of a mitigation plan." Further , the ACHP 
discussed the provisions in the S 106 r egulations that 
provide for reevaluation of determinations of eligibility and 
for the possible involvement of the Secretary of the Interior. 
The ACHP concluded that "the eligibility issue r egarding the 
historic significance of the entire Enola Branch Line will 
need to be resolved before we can consider the draft MOA." 
The ACHP stated that only after receiving for mal comments 
from the Keeper could the ACHP evaluate whether all 
possible effects had been considered. The ACHP also 
suggested a meeting among the STB, the SHPO, Conrail, 
and the ACHP. 
 
In its February 1, 1999, response, the STB described the 
manner in which it had carried out the identification 
process and asserted that the identification and effects 
phases of the S 106 process had been completed and need 
not be reopened. The STB specifically noted that changed 
perceptions or evaluations of what is historically significant 
and therefore eligible for the National Register may indeed 
justify reevaluation or reopening of pr oceedings but did not 
necessarily require such a result. Because the STB had 
found inadequate justification for reopening the 
identification stage, it continued to decline to do so. The 
STB solicited anew the ACHP's comments on mitigation and 
the MOA. 
 
The ACHP, on February 26, 1999, formally referred the 
matter to the Secretary of the Interior and informed the 
STB that, pending receipt of the Keeper's findings, it 
believed that the identification and evaluation r equirements 
had not been met. The ACHP further asserted that, if the 
STB continued its efforts to finalize the draft MOA, it would 
be in violation of its statutory and regulatory obligations. In 
April 1999, the Keeper issued a determination that the 
entire 66.5-mile Enola Branch line was eligible for 
designation in the National Register. The determination 
stated: 
 
       Constructed by the Pennsylvania Railroad between 
       1902 and 1906, the entire 66.5 mile Enola Branch Line 
       is eligible for the National Register of Historic Places for 
       its historic and engineering significance. Built as a 
       significant component of the Pennsylvania Railr oad 
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       system, the Enola Branch line was an important 
       engineering feat of the early 20th century. The Enola 
       Branch Line differed from other railroads of the period 
       in that it was designed to have no contact with other 
       vehicular routes, and it was to run almost completely 
       level and in a straight line. This straight line, with low 
       radius curves and very little change in grade, pr ovided 
       improved and efficient delivery of fr eight by rail. 
       Building the line necessitated vast amounts of cutting 
       and filling and the construction of numerous stone 
       bridges and culverts built by skilled Italian stone 
       masons. 
 
On August 13, 1999 (1999 Order), the STB denied FAST's 
petition for reconsideration of the 1997 Or der, holding that 
FAST had not made the required showing of material error, 
new evidence, or changed circumstances warranting 
reconsideration. The Board declined to give substantial 
weight to the one new piece of evidence, a letter to the 
Trust from the Curator of Transportation of the National 
Museum of American History.7 The STB found that the 
letter could have been presented earlier and noted that the 
Curator took no formal position in the matter . The STB also 
declined to reconsider the import of the TWO letter, noting 
that FAST still had not explained the discr epancy between 
that letter and the SHPO's formal position on the record 
before the STB that the only issue remaining in the 
proceeding was mitigation.8 The STB similarly rejected the 
Keeper's statement of eligibility, describing it as"pro 
forma." The STB emphasized that its identification decision 
had been based on an agreement with the SHPO about the 
properties to be protected (all of the bridges, later narrowed 
to 32 bridges and 36 archaeological areas) and that under 
these circumstances, to restart the identification process to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. That letter, dated April 2, 1997, detailed the history of the line and 
called its significance "unquestioned." The Curator stated that he could 
take "no formal position in such a legal pr oceeding," but he stated that 
he supported the development of the line, intact, as a recreational and 
educational trail. 
 
8. The STB emphasized several letters from the SHPO, post-1994, that 
appear to reflect this same view. 
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include the entire rail line "would add inexcusable delay to 
a process that has already taken much too long." 
 
The STB then terminated the consultation pr ocess and 
removed the S 106 condition, subject only to Conrail's 
compliance with the terms of the proposed, although 
unexecuted, MOA. In terminating consultation, the STB 
emphasized the steps it had taken throughout this process. 
It found that "further consultation would be fruitless." It 
further noted the fact that the ACHP would not r espond on 
the issue of mitigation, despite the STB's r equest for it to do 
so, and "instead continues to seek to dictate the[STB's] 
procedures and compel us to reopen this case and declare 
this entire rail line historic." The STB considered the 
ACHP's letters in January and February 1999 to be its 
comments and recommendations on the undertaking and 
on termination of consultation; having taken them into 
account, the STB determined that it had complied with 
S 106 and that the process was complete. 
 
The record indicates that Conrail/Nor folk has 
consummated abandonment of the rail line, other than the 
bridges. According to Norfolk, it has been more than ten 
years since there was activity on the line and more than 
eight years since there was any railroad equipment or 
property on the land. All tracks, ties, rails, signage, and 




The STB, as statutory successor to the ICC under the 
ICC Termination Act, had jurisdiction over Conrail's 
petition to abandon the Enola Branch and could do so 
under the exempt procedures. See 49 U.S.C. 
SS 10501(a)(1)(A), 10502(a)(1), 49 C.F .R. S 1152.50. We have 
exclusive jurisdiction to review a final or der of the STB, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 2321 and 2342(5), pr ovided that 
the petition for review was filed by the aggrieved party 
within 60 days of entry of the final order . See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2344. FAST filed the instant petition for review within 60 
days of service of the Board's 1999 Order . 
 
The STB and intervenor Norfolk did, however , raise two 
preliminary issues questioning our jurisdiction to review 
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the STB's order and the STB's jurisdiction should this 
matter be remanded. 
 
A. WHICH ORDER IS BEING REVIEWED? 
 
The STB argues that FAST actually is challenging the 
1990 Order that limited the scope of potentially historically 
eligible properties to the 83 bridges on the rail line. It is the 
STB's position that direct judicial review of the 1990 Order 
is precluded by S 2344, which requir es that a petition for 
review of final agency action be filed within 60 days. See 28 
U.S.C. S 2344; see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 277 (1987). Once that 60-day period 
has passed, an agency order is no longer subject to judicial 
review. See id. The STB contends that F AST is precluded 
from making any arguments that in any way address the 
manner in which the STB identified historic pr operties or 
its determination that only some bridges and archaeological 
areas are eligible for historic pr otection. The STB argues 
that we have jurisdiction to review only the plan for 
mitigation as to the bridges and the decision to ter minate 
consultation. It suggests that we may not addr ess any 
issues relating to the identification of historic properties. 
 
We disagree and conclude that we do have jurisdiction to 
review the entire matter, including those aspects of the 
STB's decisions relating to the identification of eligible 
historic properties on the rail line. First, in the 1997 Order, 
the STB rejected FAST's request that the preservation 
requirement imposed in the 1990 Or der be broadened to 
apply to the entire Enola Branch line. However , the 1997 
Order expressly stated that "[t]his proceeding is reopened." 
When the STB "reopens a proceeding for any reason and, 
after reconsideration, issues a new and final order setting 
forth the rights and obligations of the parties, that order-- 
even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set 
forth in the original order--is reviewable on its merits." 
BLE, 482 U.S. at 278 (citing United States v. Seatrain Lines, 
Inc., 329 U.S. 424 (1947)). The STB urged that the 
reopening must be understood in context, that the 
proceeding was reopened only for the limited purpose of 
narrowing the scope of the historic condition. However, 
reopening a proceeding "for any r eason," even if only to 
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reaffirm the original order , gives us jurisdiction to review 
every aspect of the reopening order . See BLE, 482 U.S. at 
278. 
 
Reopening in this case, even if only to narr ow rather than 
expand the original identification decision, makes the 
issues of identification reviewable. The STB cannot claim 
that identification was complete prior to 1997, yet still 
reopen the proceeding in order to consider some aspect of 
identification. That further consideration is subject to 
review, both as to whether it was proper to narrow the 
scope of the properties to be protected and also as to 
whether it was improper not to expand the scope of the 
protected properties. In short, the STB's explicit order to 
reopen this proceeding meant reopening for all purposes, 
thereby bringing the issue of identification back into play 
and making it subject to review at this time. 
 
Second, FAST's 1996 petition (resolved in the 1997 
Order), seeking reopening of the pr oceedings for the 
purpose of reconsidering and expanding the identification 
decision, was based on a claim of new evidence or changed 
circumstances, particularly evidence of changed opinions 
and perceptions of how much of the rail line would be 
eligible for the National Register. Wher e a motion to reopen 
is based on non-pretextual arguments about new evidence 
or changed circumstances, the refusal to r eopen or 
reconsider a decision itself is reviewable for abuse of 
discretion. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 284 ("If the petition that 
was denied sought reopening on the basis of new evidence 
or changed circumstances review is available and abuse of 
discretion is the standard."); Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 
252 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (interpreting BLE to permit merits 
review of a refusal to reopen wher e the motion is based on 
non-pretextual grounds of new evidence or changed 
circumstances); Friends of Sierra R.R., Inc. v. ICC, 881 F.2d 
663, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The or der denying [the] 
petition is subject to review only if the petition sought 
reopening on the basis of `new evidence' or`substantially 
changed circumstances.' "). Even assuming that the STB's 
1997 Order declined to reopen for the purposes of 
expanding the historic condition, that refusal to reopen is 
itself subject to judicial review. Under BLE, we would have 
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jurisdiction to determine whether the Boar d's refusal to 
expand the condition was an abuse of discretion. 
 
The STB argues that FAST did not actually submit any 
new or newly discovered evidence because the opinions of 
the ACHP, the SHPO, the Keeper, and the Curator, 
regarding the historic eligibility of the entire line, were 
available all along and could have been presented earlier. 
The STB contends, therefore, that F AST actually sought 
reopening and reconsideration based on"material error," 
the denial of which motion unquestionably would not be 
subject to judicial review. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 280 
(holding that "where a party petitions an agency for 
reconsideration on the ground of `material error,' . . . `an 
order which merely denies rehearing' . . . is not itself 
reviewable."). 
 
The STB's argument fails because it conflates the 
jurisdictional and merits analyses. Whether the evidence 
presented actually is new or newly discover ed, as opposed 
to newly presented, goes to the merits of whether the 
refusal to reopen or reconsider a prior decision was proper 
or lawful. It does not go to the jurisdiction of the court of 
appeals to review that refusal. Jurisdiction and 
reviewability are based on the fact that the motion before 
the STB alleged the existence of new evidence or changed 
circumstances. See Friends of Sierra, 881 F.2d at 666 ("[W]e 
determine reviewability solely by examining the bases 
advanced in the petition to reopen."). That basis for the 
motion, assuming it is not a pretext, is sufficient alone to 
confer jurisdiction to review the Board's refusal to expand 
the identified historic properties and pr otect the entire rail 
line. 
 
From the record before us, we conclude that FAST sought 
reopening based on new evidence or changed 
circumstances, not material error, such that the refusal to 
reopen is subject to judicial review. 
 
FAST moved within 60 days for reconsideration of the 
1997 Order, thus tolling the period for seeking judicial 
review of the 1997 Order until reconsideration was denied. 
The 1999 Order denied reconsideration of the refusal to 
reopen and the petition for review wasfiled within 60 days. 
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We have jurisdiction, therefore, to review the 1997 Order 
through its denial by the 1999 Order . See BLE, 482 U.S. at 
279 (stating that a petition for reconsideration tolls the 
period for judicial review of the original or der, which can be 
appealed directly after the petition for r econsideration is 
denied). 
 
B. THE STB'S JURISDICTION ON REMAND 
 
Norfolk, as intervenor on behalf of the STB, raises a 
different argument, going to the STB's jurisdiction on 
remand. Norfolk suggests that, because it has abandoned 
the Enola Branch, the STB no longer would have 
jurisdiction on remand to make any deter minations as to 
the historic status of the line as a whole or to impose 
mitigation conditions on any non-bridge property. It argues 
that any decision vacating the STB's original identification 
decision and remanding the case to the STB would be futile 
because, beyond the bridges already identified, the STB 
would be without the power to impose any historic 
conditions on the abandoned line as a whole.9 
 
It is true, generally, that once a carrier abandons a rail 
line, the line no longer is part of the national transportation 
system and the STB's jurisdiction terminates. See Preseault 
v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.3 (1990). Unless the STB attaches 
post-abandonment conditions to a certificate of 
abandonment or exemption, such as requir ements under 
S 106, the authorization of abandonment ends the Board's 
regulatory mission and its jurisdiction. See id.; Hayfield N. 
R.R. Co., Inc. v. Chicago & Northwestern T ransp. Co., 474 
U.S. 622, 633-34 (1984). The determination of whether a 
railroad has abandoned a line hinges on the railroad's 
objective intent to cease permanently or indefinitely all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Norfolk raises the issue of the STB's jurisdiction for the first time 
on 
appeal. In opposing FAST's motion to r eopen before the STB, Norfolk 
never suggested that the STB was without jurisdiction to expand the 
scope of the historical condition on the rail line. Yet if the STB would 
have had jurisdiction to expand the historical condition in the 1997 
Order, it is not clear why the STB would lack jurisdiction to do the same 
on remand from our determination that the 1997 Order declining to 
reopen was in error. 
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transportation service on the line. See Birt v. Surface 
Transp. Bd., 90 F.3d 580, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Abandonment is 
considered consummated when the rail line is fully 
abandoned. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Sur face Transp. 
Bd., 93 F.3d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 
We reject Norfolk's argument because there has been no 
STB finding that Norfolk consummated abandonment of the 
rail line as an entire property. Following the 1990 Order, 
Conrail removed all remnants of the railr oad line from the 
property, including all tracks, ties, rails, signage, and 
equipment. According to Norfolk, it has been more than ten 
years since there was activity on the pr operty, more than 
eight years since there was railroad equipment on the 
property, and more than seven years since Conrail 
attempted to negotiate converting the rail into a trail. 
 
But the historical eligibility of the line as a whole does 
not require the presence of the tracks and other railroad 
equipment. The historically eligible property, as found by 
the Keeper and urged by FAST, is the rail line itself, 
including the trail and all of the bridges. The issue is 
whether Norfolk has abandoned, sold, or otherwise 
disposed of any portion of that property, a point on which 
the record is silent. If, on remand, the STB concludes that 
Norfolk has disposed of some portion of the line, the STB 
will be without power to expand the historical condition to 
cover that property already sold. But the STB otherwise 
does have the power to expand the historical condition to 
cover all property not abandoned and to r equire Norfolk to 
preserve the status quo and not to sell or otherwise disturb 
or dispose of the rail line pending proper completion of the 
S 106 process. 
 
IV. HISTORIC ELIGIBILITY OF THE ENOLA LINE 
 
We now proceed to the merits of this petition, whether 
the STB erred in carrying out its statutory obligations 
under S 106. Our review is governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. S 706(2), which provides that 
a court of appeals may "hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, 
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A); see Consolidated 
Rail Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(applying S 706 to review of ICC decision). 
 
As we set out in Part I.B, supra, the NHP A is a 
procedural rather than a substantive statute, designed to 
ensure that federal agencies take into account the effect on 
historic places of federally regulated undertakings. See 
Morris County Trust, 714 F.2d at 278-79. The statute 
represents a balance between the goals of historic 
preservation and the needs of business and community 
development. See id. at 280; 37 C.F.R. S 800.1(a). Our 
concern on review under the NHPA is less with the 
substantive results reached by the STB on the historic 
eligibility of the Enola Branch than with the pr ocedures 
and reasoning the STB followed in reaching those results. 
See Morris County Trust, 714 F.2d at 280. We have agreed 
that S 106 is a "stop, look, and listen" provision, requiring 
an agency to acquire and consider infor mation prior to 
making a decision and approving a federal undertaking. See 
Concerned Citizens, 176 F.3d at 695-96 (citing Illinois 
Commerce Comm'n, 848 F.2d at 1260-61). 
 
The issue, therefore, is whether the STB touched all the 
procedural bases in limiting the scope of the identified 
historic properties on the line to the 32 bridges and 36 
archaeological areas, in refusing to expand that 
identification in 1997 and 1999, in unilaterally approving 
the mitigation plan outlined in the draft MOA and the 1999 
Order, and in terminating consultation in the 1999 Order. 
We conclude that the STB did not touch all the bases. The 
STB's decision to terminate the process as it did, and to 
provide only limited historic protection, must be vacated 





Although there would appear to be a lack of constructive 
public dialogue in the whole of the S 106 identification 
process, FAST did not seek review of the 1990 Order at the 
time it issued, nor has FAST formally complained about the 
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early stages of the S 106 identification. W e will begin our 
analysis therefore with the events occurring after FAST's 
1996 petition to reopen and expand the historic condition. 
In the 1997 and 1999 Orders, the STB concluded that the 
TWO letter and the letter from the Curator wer e not new or 
newly discovered evidence in that both pieces of 
information were available prior to their submission to the 
STB in 1996. The STB also discounted the SHPO's position 
as stated in the TWO letter because it was inconsistent with 
its formal position before the STB and the inconsistency 
was not explained. In addition, in the 1999 Or der, the STB 
rejected the Keeper's statement as "pr o forma" and not 
justifying reopening the identification phase because doing 
so "would add inexcusable delay to a process that has 
already taken much too long." 
 
The identification process must, however , be a fluid and 
ongoing one. "The passage of time, changing per ceptions of 
significance, or incomplete prior evaluations may require 
the Agency Official to reevaluate properties previously 
determined eligible or ineligible." 36 C.F .R. S 800.4(c)(1) 
(emphasis added). The STB's own regulations also permit it 
to reopen or reconsider a prior action because of new 
evidence or substantially changed circumstances. See 49 
U.S.C. S 722(c). If we read S 722(c) together with 
S 800.4(c)(1), these provisions suggest that evidence of 
changed perceptions of historical significance constitutes 
evidence of substantially changed circumstances, thus 
permitting reopening or reconsideration. 
 
In the 1997 and 1999 Orders, however, the STB focused 
only on whether FAST had submitted new evidence; it did 
not consider whether FAST had submitted evidence of 
substantially changed circumstances. This ruling ignores 
the "changed circumstances" language ofS 722(c). 
 
Furthermore, the STB failed to consider the Keeper's 
statement that the entire Enola Branch line was eligible for 
designation in the National Register. The ACHP had taken 
the position that the Keeper's findings wer e necessary 
before the identification process could be completed. Once 
the ACHP had brought the Keeper into the pr ocess, the 
Keeper's conclusions had to be considered. As we noted in 
Part I.B, supra, the Keeper has been held to have 
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independent authority to determine whether a property 
should be listed in the National Register. See Moody Hill 
Farms, 205 F.3d at 558. 
 
The STB ignored the Keeper's determination because of 
its "untimeliness" and the STB's concer n that considering it 
would impose additional, inexcusable delay on theS 106 
process. This consideration of late timing is, however, 
inconsistent with S 800.4(c)(1). If the passage of time can be 
a basis for reevaluation of the identification decision under 
the regulations, it cannot at the same time be a basis for 
refusing to consider evidence of changed per ceptions of 
historical significance. By focusing on the timing of the 
Keeper's statement and refusing to consider and address its 
merits, the STB introduced an improper consideration into 
the identification process. The fact that the STB and the 
SHPO had previously agreed that the bridges were the only 
properties that were historically eligible does not and 
cannot outweigh, without further explanation, the Keeper's 
determination, whenever that determination was rendered. 
See Moody Hills, 205 F.3d at 558-59 (stating that the 
Keeper is not bound by the historic determinations of state 
and local authorities). 
 
The STB also dismissed the Keeper's statement as"pro 
forma" and therefore not entitled to serious weight. 
However, the STB did not indicate in what way the 
statement was pro forma, nor did it indicate what 
additional information the Keeper should have presented in 
its evaluation. The Keeper's evaluation included a lengthy 
paragraph describing the Enola Branch's overall historic 
significance; the Board has not explained why the Keeper's 
position was not entitled at least to some consideration. 
 
The STB is correct in contending that, because it and the 
SHPO initially did not disagree as to the scope of eligible 
properties, the STB was not requir ed under the regulations 
to request a determination from the Secretary of the 
Interior or from the Keeper. Such a r eferral is required only 
if the STB and the SHPO do not agree. See  36 C.F.R. 
S 800.4(c)(2). However, that same r egulation provides that 
the Secretary or the ACHP can request such a 
determination at any time, whether or not the STB and the 
SHPO disagree. See 36 C.F.R.S 800.4(c)(2). Given the 
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authority of the Keeper, it must follow that once that 
determination has been obtained, it is entitled to some 
attention by the agency. 
 
Moreover, the fact that the SHPO's position in the TWO 
letter in 1994, that the entire line was eligible for the 
National Register, appeared to be a change from its earlier 
position before the STB was not sufficient gr ounds for the 
STB not to consider that letter as evidence of changed 
perceptions. The STB argues that nothing in the statutes or 
regulations requires it to rethink its decisions whenever an 
affected party changes its mind. See Connecticut Trust for 
Historic Preservation v. ICC, 841 F .2d 479, 484 (2d Cir. 
1988). However, Connecticut Trust  involved a potential 
purchaser of the abandoned rail property that changed its 
mind about which portions of the line it wanted to 
purchase. See id. That is significantly different from a 
change of position by the SHPO, which is statutorily 
empowered to advise the STB throughout theS 106 process 
and is not an affected party in the same way as a would-be 
purchaser. The SHPO's revised view as to the eligibility of 
the entire rail line may represent a changed perception of 
historic significance or be the result of a more complete 
evaluation of the property. The SHPO's changed perception 
should have received some consideration on its merits and 
should not have been rejected out of hand as an 
unexplained change of heart. 
 
The STB similarly erred in not giving sufficient 
consideration to the views of the ACHP. While the ultimate 
decision on an undertaking remains with the agency 
implementing it, the ACHP must be affor ded the 
opportunity to comment and its comments must be taken 
into account by the agency in rendering its decision. See 
Concerned Citizens, 176 F.3d at 695 (quoting Waterford 
Citizens' Ass'n v. Reilly, 970 F.2d 1287, 1290 (4th Cir. 
1992)). The agency must make clear that it consider ed the 
ACHP's opinions, see Concerned Citizens , 176 F.3d at 696, 
instead of dismissing them as an attempt by the ACHP to 
"dictate" the STB's procedures. 
 
The ACHP formally became involved in the S 106 process 
in March 1998, at the request of F AST, during the 
pendency of FAST's motion for reconsideration. ACHP 
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involvement was not required at the identification stage and 
the STB did not err in not immediately seeking ACHP 
comments on identification. However, the ACHP is identified 
as a source of guidance and advice regar ding the 
application of the regulations; it also is empowered to enter 
the S 106 process at any time that it determines that its 
involvement is necessary to ensure that the purposes and 
requirements of S 106 are met. See 36 C.F.R. S 800.2(b). 
Once the ACHP entered the proceedings, the STB, although 
not required to follow the comments and suggestions of the 
ACHP at any stage, was required to take these comments 
into account and to indicate that the comments wer e given 
genuine attention on their merits. The relevant"agency 
must demonstrate that it has read and consider ed those 
recommendations" and "it must make clear in the record 
that the ACHP's comments were taken seriously." See 
Concerned Citizens, 176 F.3d at 696. 
 
The record here shows that the ACHP's comments were 
not taken seriously.10 In several letters to the STB following 
its decision to participate in the consultation, the ACHP 
raised its concerns about the way in which historically 
eligible properties had been identified and its desire to see 
further consideration of what properties on the rail line 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The parties dispute the amount of defer ence or weight to be accorded 
to the ACHP's interpretation of its regulations. FAST relies on our 
statement in Morris County that "the Advisory Council's regulations are 
particularly persuasive concerning the pr oper interpretation of NHPA." 
See Morris County, 714 F.2d at 280. Nor folk points to the statements in 
Concerned Citizens that found no support for the conclusion that the 
ACHP's judgments were entitled to great weight. See Concerned Citizens, 
176 F.3d at 696 n.6. FAST argues that Concerned Citizens was a case 
challenging the Federal Highway Administration's compliance with S 4(f) 
of the Department of Transportation Act, in which the ACHP plays no 
role. By contrast, the instant case is a challenge to compliance with the 
ACHP's own regulations under the NHPA. W e need not resolve this 
matter because, even assuming that the ACHP's judgment is entitled 
only to minimal weight and that the agency mer ely must afford these 
comments some attention and consideration, see Concerned Citizens, 
176 F.3d at 696, we conclude that the STB in the instant case did not 
accord the ACHP's comments even that minimal degree of attention and 
consideration. 
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should be identified as historic. The STB did not respond to 
these concerns. 
 
Moreover, any delay in ACHP participation and comment 
may be attributed, at least in part, to the STB. The STB 
apparently did not, as required, notify the ACHP of its 
determination of adverse effects at the time of its initial 
presumptive finding of such effects in 1990. See 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.6(a)(1) (requiring notification of the ACHP upon a 
finding of adverse effects). The STB also did not involve the 
ACHP when requested to do so by FAST , sometime prior to 
March 1998. Instead, FAST was for ced to contact the ACHP 
itself, pursuant to 36 C.F.R. S 800.6(a)(1)(ii). As a result, the 
ACHP did not become involved in the proceedings until 
March 1998. 
 
Finally, the STB never mentioned or gave any 
consideration to the detailed statement by Lancaster 
County, in its 1989 objection to Conrail's Notice of 
Exemption, as to the historic significance of the line as a 
whole. The substance of this statement was similar to the 
comments made by the Keeper in its 1999 deter mination of 
eligibility. Although the County did not expr essly request a 
historic condition on the abandonment of the line, its 
comments provided the STB with initial evidence as to the 
historical significance of the rail line as a linear source. 
Like any other evidence from an interested party, this was 
entitled to some consideration by the Board in identifying 
historic properties. However, the r ecord does not reflect that 
the Board ever recognized or consider ed the merits of this 
statement. 
 
B. TERMINATION OF CONSULTA TION 
 
FAST also challenges the manner in which the STB 
terminated the regulatory consultation. After declining to 
reconsider FAST's request to expand the historic condition 
and protect the entire rail line, the STB unilaterally 
terminated consultation on mitigation, unilaterally 
terminated the entire S 106 pr ocess, and imposed the terms 
of the unexecuted MOA, finding that it "constitutes 
appropriate historic mitigation for the bridges at issue." 
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The terms of the MOA were established following 
negotiations among the STB, Conrail, and the SHPO; all 
three agreed to terms, including r ecordation of five bridges, 
funding of the film, transfer of certain bridge pr operties to 
local municipalities, and payment of money by Conrail for 
upkeep of those bridges. However, the SHPO declined to 
sign the MOA, citing the ACHP's desire to consult in the 
process. At that point, the STB was requir ed to invite the 
ACHP formally to participate in the consultation, and, if the 
ACHP declined to consult, to obtain the ACHP's comments 
on the undertaking and on the proposed mitigation plan. 
See 36 C.F.R. SS 800.6(b)(1)(v), 800.7(c)(2). The STB did 
submit a copy of the MOA to the ACHP for comment and 
approval; the ACHP expressly declined to comment on the 
MOA or the mitigation plan, focusing its comments instead 
on what it found to be deficiencies in the S 106 process 
generally and the need to reconsider identification. 
 
The STB certainly has the power to declare consultation 
at an impasse and to terminate, if it finds that further 
consultation would not be productive. See  36 C.F.R. 
S 800.7(a). However, the applicable r egulations require that, 
if the STB does terminate consultation, it must give notice 
of that termination to the ACHP, see 36 C.F.R. S 800.7(a)(1); 
allow 45 days for ACHP comments on termination, see 36 
C.F.R. S 800.7(c)(2); and take those comments into account, 
giving them genuine attention and consideration, in 
terminating consultation and reaching afinal decision. See 
36 C.F.R. S 800.7(c)(4). Only after r eceipt and consideration 
of those comments may the STB complete the ter mination 
of the process and implement a mitigation plan, provided 
that it expressly take such comments into account in 
rendering that final decision. See Concer ned Citizens, 176 
F.3d at 696. The STB did not meet these r equirements for 
termination. 
 
We can understand the impatience of the STB to resolve 
this expedited abandonment. Nevertheless, when 
procedures are established by law, those procedures must 
be followed. Because the STB did not follow the r equired 
procedures, we conclude that it abused its discretion in 
implementing the MOA and in terminating the consultation. 
For these reasons, the 1997 and 1999 Or ders will be 
vacated and this matter will be remanded to the STB. 
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In determining to vacate and remand this matter, we in 
no way suggest that FAST is entitled to the r elief it seeks. 
We take no position as to whether the entir e Enola Branch 
is eligible for inclusion in the National Register or as to 
whether there is sufficient evidence of changed perceptions 
of historical significance or changed circumstances to 
justify preserving the entire line. W e also take no position 
as to whether the mitigation plan favored by the STB is 
proper although we note that the ultimate decision is left to 
the STB after due consideration of comments fr om 
interested parties. See Concerned Citizens, 176 F.3d at 696. 
We also take no position as to whether consultation is at an 
impasse and whether the process properly should be 
terminated. We hold only that, on r emand, the STB must 
conduct the S 106 process in accor dance with the 
regulations. It must consider the comments and opinions of 
the Keeper, the ACHP, and other inter ested parties as to the 
scope of the eligible historic properties and as to a proper 
mitigation plan. If the STB again decides that further 
consultation is fruitless and that the S 106 process should 
be termination, it must follow the procedural track 




For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the STB to 
dismiss the petition for review is denied. The petition for 
review is granted and the 1997 and 1999 Or ders of the STB 
are vacated. This matter is remanded to the Surface 
Transportation Board for further pr oceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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